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ABSTRACT
 
A model demonstrates how reciprocal market-completing
 
externalities can prcgressively reduce the costs of market
 
transactions among buyers, export intermediaries and
 
manufacturers and thereby sustain endogenous industrial expansion
 
subsequent to an initial exogenous stimulus. Transactions cost
 
analysis accounts for the presence of intermediaries.
 
Comparative static analysis reveals that endogenous expansion is
 
greater if industrial firms are small, and if a nation is
 
transactionally relatively efficient at the outset of
 
industrialization. Reciprocal market-completing externalities
 
emerge as the counterpart for small-firm industrial economies,
 
such as Taiwan'-, to dynamic internal economies in large-firm
 
industrial econcmies, such as Korea's.
 
Analysis that places externalities 
 at the center of the process of
 
industrial expansion, pioneered by Scitovsky (1954) 
and Hirschman (1958), is
 
enjoying something of a revival.1 
This paper combines externality analysis and
 
transactions cost analysis2 to explore 
the relation between the character and
 
intensity of growth-promoting externalities and the 
nature of the institutions
 
that dominate 
a country's industrial sector. More specifically, the paper
 
presents a that
model demonstrates how, in institutional settings in 
which
 
markets are dominated on both 
sides by relatively small firms, 
 'market­
completing dynamic externalities' 
-- externalities created reciprocally by the
 
entry of participants 
on one side of a market for participants on the other-­
can progressively reduce 
the costs of market trarsactions and thereby sustain
 
endogenous expansion subsequent to some 
initial exogenous stimulus.
 
The impetus for the theory was a 
puzzle that emerged in the course of
 
comparative field research on patterns 
of industrialization 
in Korea and
 
Taiwan. For all of the similarities in pricing and macroeconomic policies, 3 
the
 
institutional foundations 
 of outward-oriented 
industrialization 
were quite
 
1 For overviews of the implications of external 
economies for strategic

trade policy in industrialized and less developed countries, 
see Krugman (1987)

and Pack and Westphal (1986).
 
2 For a landrark contribution, see Williamson (1985). 
For a synthesis of
 
Williamson's and related perspectives, see Alston and Gillespie (1988).
 
3 For a useful 
summary of the most relevant similarities, see Paul W.
 
Kuznets (1988)
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different in the two countries: between 1966 and 1976, the number of
 
manufacturing firms in Taiwan increased by 150 percent, while the average
 
enterprise size, measured by number of employees, increased by only 29 percent;
 
over the same period, the number of Korean manufacturing firms increased by
 
4

only 10 percent, and the number of employees per enterprise by 176 percent.

The process of industrial expansion based on large enterprises is by now quite
 
well understood; the role in this process of learning economies within the firm
 
appears to be particularly crucial.5 This Daper highlights market-completing
 
dynamic externalities as the counterpart of internal learning economies in
 
industrial economies where small and medium enterprises play a central role.
 
Consistent with field observation of the disproportionately large roles
 
played by export traders in Taiwan relative to Korea, 6 the model is developed
 
for markets in which intermediaries -- agents who use specialized skills and 
4 Establishments with 500 or more employees accounted for 25.7 percent of
 
Korean manufacturing employment in 1966, and 40.5 percent in 1981; 500-or-more
 
employee establishments accounted for 34.7 percent of Taiwan's 1966
 
manufacturing employment, but for only 27.5 percent of the corresponding share
 
in 1981. Estimates of shares in 1966 and 1981 are from Republic of Korea,
 
Economic Planning Board, Mining and Manufacturing Surveys, and Republic of
 
China, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive
 
Yuan, The Reports on the Industrial and Commercial Census, Taiwan-Fukien Area;
 
the data on patterns between 1966 and 1976 are from Scitovsky (1986).
 
5 For a useful synthesis, see Pack and W, 'hal (1986); see also Amsden
 
(1988).
 
6 In 1973 there were 2,800 export traders active in Taiwan (with an
 
average value of $1.4 million industrial exports per trader) and 1,200 in Korea
 
(with an average industrial export value of $2.6 million per trader). By 1984,
 
the number of export traders active in Taiwan had risen over seven-fold to
 
20,600 (with industrial exports per trader remaining steady at $1.4 million per
 
trader); the number active in Korea had risen somewhat more than four-fold to
 
5,30C ($5.2 million industrial exports per trader. A comparative case study of
 
the footwear industries in the two countries uncovered quite distinctive roles
 
for national traders in particular: in Taiwan, export trading operations run by
 
nationals accounted for 50 percent or more of the sales of over three-fourths
 
of the firms; none of a sample of Korean firms channelled more than 50 percent
 
of their exports through national traders. See Levy (1988) for further details.
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information 
to match buyers and sellers of some specified product -- play a 
central role. In principle the analysis is more general, and has the potential 
to help explain, for example, how market-completing externalities can sustain
 
endogenous expansion via 
a proliferation of vertically-related subcontracting
 
among independent small and medium enterprises. 7
 
as 
 starting point optimizing
 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section lays out from a 
transactions cost perspective the rationale for the presence of 
intermediaries. The second section takes its 
behavior on the part of individual buyers, 
traders and manufacturers, and
 
develops 
 a model that demonstrates how 
 reciprocal market-completing
 
externalities can set 
in motion a process of endogenous expansion subsequent to
 
some 
initial exogenous stimulus. The third 
section analyzes the comparative
 
statics of how the extent of endogenous expansion might vary with the size of
 
firms, and with the 
 specific economic conditions prevailing in individual
 
countries. The final 
section explores some implications of the analysis for
 
industrial policy.
 
THE ROLE OF TRADERS: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT
 
From a transactions cost perspective 
the presence of traders signals 
that,
 
in 
a world of bounded rationality and opportunism, they represent a privately
 
efficient institutional mechanism 
for organizing some class of economic
 
transactions. The task of analysis is 
to specify the character of that class of
 
transactions, and to delineate the 
nat-tre of the advantage enjoyed by traders.
 
7 For some evidence of a Korean propensity towards vertical integration,

and a Taiwanese propensity towards subcontractir.6 in similar product lines, 
see

Levy (1988), Levy and Kuo (1987), 
and Amsden (1985, 1988).
 
4
 
Transactional Characteristics
 
The analysis focuses on market transactions fur products as disparate 
as
 
running shoes, custom-fashioned clothing, childrens toys, and standardized
 
electronic components, transactions characterized by the following features.
 
First, the products are well-defined and have attributes that are measurable at
 
relatively low cost. Second, they are manufactured using general purpose
 
technology, with no productive asset dedicated to fulfilling 
the particular
 
order of some 
specific buyer. Third, although there exists the potential for
 
recurrent exchange, both buyer and seller into a specific
enter transaction
 
solely on its expected merits. Fourth, each transaction involves a delay
 
between the time when buyers specify the design of the product and place their
 
orders, and the time of delivery. Fifth, the transactions are international: 
buyers in the importing country buy from manufacturers in the exporting nation, 
with the objective of earning B profit by reselling to final users in the 
importing country. Sixth, production from the exporting country is a small
 
fraction of the total potential world market; thus expansion in export
 
capacity is assumed to have 
no impact on the price paid by consumers. Finally,
 
markets are competitive. Firms are not identical however, but differ in their
 
earnings of efficiency rents.
 
Two implications follow straightforwardly from the above. First, the absence
 
of specific, dedicated assets, the ready measurability of the product to be
 
traded, and the absence of any presumption of recurrent, long-term exchange
 
together imply that there is no incentive for any party to organize the
 
transaction on a vertically integrated oasis, 
or f.r the parties to engage in
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complex bilateral or trilateral contracting.8 Second, the 
time delay implies a 
measure of r.'sk for both buyer and seller but the ready measurability of output 
implies that participants can straightforwardly secure contractual protection. 
Typically, this contractual protection takes the form of a promissory note (a
 
letter of credit) issut.d by a bank 
on the authority of the buyer, with the
 
buyer obligated to pay 
only upon receipt of 
the goods in satisfactory
 
condition; 
in some countries manufacturers 
are able to borrow against this
 
letter of credit to cover the 
costs of their working capital.
 
It is important 
 for what follows that, notwithstanding contractual
 
protection, the parties are 
not indifferent as 
to whom they contract with, or
 
as to whether contractual obligations 
are met. Parties on each side of a
 
transaction are 
taken to differ both in the 
terms they offer, and in the
 
reliability with which they 
meet these terms. Aside 
from differences in
 
competence, suppliers 
 in particular may 
 have an incentive to behave
 
opportunistically, 9 
for example taking 
on orders as a way of gaining access to
 
rationed, relatively low-interest working capital 
for other purposes, with no
 
interest of fulfilling the contracted terms.1 0 Correspondingly, each potential
 
participant 
 is taken to be boundedly rational: prior 
to a transaction,
 
participants are assued to have no 
information as 
to the capabilities of each
 
8 Insofar 
as se of intermediaries multiplies the number 
of relevant
 
contracting relationships, their role 
is likely to be limited in transactions
involving complex, 
 long-term contracts. 
 For the relationship of asset
specificity and 
recurrent contracting 
to vertical integration, see Williamson
(1985) 
 pp. 42-63. For an analysis 
 of complex bilateral or trilateral
contracting, see Williamson (1985) pp. 74-77; 
163-205. For the relationship of

measurability to vertical integration, see Barzel (1982).
 
9 As defined by Williamson (1985) pp. 47-49.
 
10 For evidence of the disproportionately low-cost 
character of working

capital in Korea and its 
impact on the behavior of manufacturers, see 
Park
 (1983); 
also Cole and Park (1983).
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of their potential counterparts; but they can, 
at a cost, engage in search
 
activities as 
a way of learning about these capabilities.
 
Buyers and sellers have different search tasks, given contractual protection
 
of the form described above. Sellers 
'he they manufacturers selling either to
 
intermediaries or final buyers, or intermediaries selling to final buyers) 
are
 
assured of payment subsequent to the issuance of a letter of credit; 
thus their
 
transactional task is 
to 
search among buyers for those offering favorable unit
 
prices for a given set 
of quality requirements. Buyers (be they 
final buyers
 
procuring directly from manufacturers or 
indirectly through intermediaries, or
 
intermediaries procuring 
from manufacturers) also search for 
favorable price­
quality offers; but they are concerned in addition with 
the reliability of
 
suppliers. Notwithstanding contractual 
protection, nonperformance would lead
 
buyers to lose any profit they stood 
to gain through resale of the purchased
 
items. And 
 plans for resale typically involve obligations to parties
 
downstream, so 
buyers suffer costs of reputation loss 
if they do not meet the
 
obligations.11 Thus, buyers search for 
 information on potential sellers'
 
reliability as well as 
price and quality.
 
The Role of Traders
 
What institutional mechanism of 
search is likely 
to be most efficient for
 
buyers? With vertical integration ruled out, buyers can either search directly
 
among potential manufacturers, or they can 
procure through intermediaries.
 
Reflection (and a review of 
the fragmented and, 
for the most part, anecdotal,
 
literature) uncovers 
 no shortage of reasons 
 why procurement through
 
11 Of course, in principle a purchase contract could include penalty
 
clauses for nonperformance. But, unlike the self-enforcing protection afforded
by a letter of credit, the enforcement of penalty clauses typically requires

costly recourse to the legal system.
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intermediaries 
is likely to be the 
more efficient choice in 
a wide variety of
 
circumstances. 
 Eight distinct propositions 
 that point to the efficiency
 
advantages 
 of intermediaries 
 (some more plausible than others) can be
 
delineated.
 
Proposition 1. Insofar as 
procurement is international in character and from
 
a supplying country with 
which the putative buyer has 
no prior experience,
 
buyers need to 
learn about 
the formal and informal requirement3 associated with
 
exporting from the 
supplying country. 
Such information is 
in the nature of an
 
indivisible set-up cost borne 
by each firm that 
procures from 
the relevant
 
exporting country. Given this indivisibility, it likely to
is 
 be more efficient
 
for small volume buyers in particu1lr to pronure from 
traders able to spread
 
their overhead costs among multiple purchasers than to seek to procure directly
 
from manufacturers.12
 
Proposition 2. 
 International 
procurement 
requires familiarity with the
 
cultures, and proficiency in the languages, of both the importing and exporting
 
nations. Insofar as these 
capabilities are 
in scarce supply, 
there might be
 
substantial 
returns from employing 
them to maximum capacity. And insofar as
 
these skills can be 
supplied most efficiently by individuals expert 
in trading
 
in the relevant industry, there is a case (for all but the largest buyers) for
 
concentrating these skills within a 
specialized trading operation. 1 3
 
Proposition 3. 
 Along with general 
 trading information, international
 
procurement requires specific 
information 
on the attributes of potential
 
12 Caves (1974) uses a parallel argument to explain why 
multinational
 
firms tend to be relatively large.
 
13 A number of 
scholars have suggested that the central role played by
giant Japanese trading companies may in part have its origins in the initial
scarcity of Japanese 
familiar with 
the institutions 
of foreign trade, and
conversant In English. For 
one example, see Yoshino and Lifson (1986) p. 21..
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manufacturers. This information, once 
collected, represents a quasi-public good
 
within a firm insofar as there is 
little, if any, incremental cost to repeated
 
use. 
Direct buyers by definition collect information solely for the purposes of
 
their own procurement decisions. But intermediaries can sell information as 
to
 
the characteristics of manufacturers to 
multiple buyers, thereby spreading the
 
information 
costs among a larger number of transactions. Insofar 
 as
 
intermediaries serve multiple 
buyers, both marginal and average costs per
 
purchaser of information will below
be the cost associated with direct
 
procurement.14
 
Proposition 4 Asyumetries in position and 
 in the availability of
 
information imply that information costs 
and the costs of securing contractual
 
compliance are likely 
to be low for traders national to the exporting nation,
 
relative to both direct buyers 
and traders headquartered in the importing (or
 
some third) country. First, knowledge of their domestic business environment is
 
nothing special to traders national tc 
the exporting country. accumulated as a
 
relatively costless joint product 
in the course of routine business activity.
 
Second, being local may make it 
less costly for a national than for a foreign
 
company to navigate the bureaucratic maze, and the maze 
of custom associated
 
with trading. Third, a national is likely 
to tap more readily into channels
 
that afford reliable, low cost information with respect to the attributes of
 
individual suppliers. Fourth, by virtue 
of kinship and similar ties, traders
 
national to the exporting 
country might be able to compel compliance from
 
manufacturers, ensuring that 
they abjure opportunism and supply reliably 
as
 
14. At least implicitly, this proposition underlies the 
rationales for
 
intermediation developed in the Lusiness literature 
on marketing channels. See
 
Etgar and Zusman (1982); also Balderston (1958).
 
9
 
contracted, at 
lower cost 
than might foreign buyers or traders. 15 Thus it will
 
be efficient to procure through 
traders national 
to the exporting country,
 
assuming that they can be identified at relatively low cost.
 
Propo.ition 5. Manufacturers and traders national 
to the exporting country
 
(and manufacturers 
 and traders headquartered elsewhere) 
 may differ
 
systematically 
 in the reputations they 
 enjoy with buyers. Insofar 
 as
 
intermediaries tend to have more established reputations than do manufacturers,
 
buyers will find it less costly to learn about the attributes of intermediaries
 
than about the attributes of manufacturers. An important corollary, highlighted
 
by Akerlof (1970), is that 
the presence of intermdiarios 
that both have
 
established a reputation with buyers 
and have access to low 
cost channels of
 
learning about manufacturers, adds 
to the opportunities for entry by new firms
 
in the exporting nation.
 
Proposition 6. There may be 
scale economies in the acquisition of specific
 
information 
as to the attributes 
of 
potential manufacturers 
insofar 
as the
 
incremental 
 costs of learning about 
 one more supplier fall with 
 the
 
accumulation of industry-specific knowledge. Alternatively, insofar as 
a broad
 
information 
base yields valuable system-related insigints 
 that cannot be
 
captured by 
more narrowly 
focused knowledge (insofar, that 
is, as there exist
 
informational 
externalities 
such 
that incremental 
information 
increases 
the
 
value of existing knowledge), marginal returns might rise with tke accumulation
 
of additional 
information. 1 6 
The presence of economies 
of scale implies that
 
15 For discussion of the informational disabilities of foreigners relative
to nationals 
in the context 
of the analysis of multinational firms,
(1982) pp. 12-13. For see Caves
a general discussion of 
the impact of kinship ties 
on
contracting, see Ben-Porath (1980).
 
16 For the advantages of a broad information base, see 
Cho (1987) pp. 100;

also Yoshino and Lifson (1986) pp. 53-4.
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procurement through intermediaries will be efficient for all but the largest
 
buyers.
 
ProposiLion 7. The indivisible assets described in propositions 1 and 2 are
 
not specialized to trade in any specific commodity. Thus, 
insofar as the set-up
 
costs associated with each are substantial and, as quasi-public goods they are
 
available in unlimited capacity 
within the firm, trading companies might be
 
able to realize economies of scope by dealing in more than one commodity.1 7
 
Proposition 8. Along with informational and bureaucratic tasks,
 
international procurement 
involves financing, warehousing, and transportation.
 
Insofar as economies of scope can be realized through the joint provision of
 
information, procedural, finance, -torage and transportation facilities by a
 
single, functionally diversified trading company, direct procurement by a
 
foreign buyer (and corresponding multiple, independent contracts for the
 
requisite services) would be inefficient. 1 8
 
Consistent with propositions 1-8, the model to be developed below takes
 
purchase through intermediaries to represent the efficient institutional
 
mechanism of procurement and explores how, subsequent to an initial exogenous
 
stimulus, reciprocal, market-completing externalities among buyers, traders and
 
manufacturers can sustain a virtuous spiral, a sequential, cumulative
 
reinforcing process of expanded participation in a nation's industrial economy.
 
Comparative static analysis of 
 the model will show market-completing
 
externalities to have a greater impact the smaller are 
the sizes of firms. And
 
17 For an analysis of the relationship between indivisibilities, quasi­
public goods and economies of scope enjoyed by firms, see Teece (1980).
 
18 For the argument that there are 'synergies' associated with functional
 
diversification by trading companies, see Cho 
(1987) pp. 93-107; also Yoshino
 
and Lifson (1986) pp. 47-52.
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propositions 1-8 help illuminate the circumstances in which firms will be small
 
-- and the endogenous expansion via market-completing 
 externalities
 
correspondingly large 

-- in transactions involving interiii.diaries.
 
First, the propositions 
 imply that intermediaries will 
receive orders
 
disproportionately from 
small buyers, and will procure disproportionately from
 
small manufacturers. Propositions 1, 2 and o highlight how indivisibilities and
 
informational scale economies might induce small-volume buyers in particular to
 
favor intermediaries; propositions 3-5, 
7 and 8 highlight how, for both small.
 
and large buyers, 
the quasi-public good character of information, economies of
 
scope, and informational asy:netries 
among buyers, traders 
and manufacturers
 
give efficiency advantages 
 to purchase via traders. 
 But these latter
 
propositions may be 
unimportant to buyers 
in large volume if search costs 
are
 
very small relative to 
the total value of the order. Thus two submarkets can be
 
distinguished for 
products where production scale 
economies (or diseconomies)
 
do not wholly determine industry structure: a submarket for small 
volume
 
orders, heterogenous in specification, 
and a submarket for large volume,
 
standardized orders, with 
intermediaries 
more likely to participate in the
 
small-volume 
 submarket. 
 Small manufacturers 
 will b represented
 
disproportionately in the small-volume submarket insofar 
as large manufacturers
 
prefer the greater transactiona] efficiencies 
 and learning opportunities
 
associated with 
large orders, and small manufacturers are constrained to 
small
 
orders. Such 
a pattern is consistent with 
observed disparities between Korea
 
and Taiwan in firm size 
and in reliance 
on direct procurement relative to
 
procurement through intermediaries.
 
Second, propositions 1.8 help clarify the determinants of the efficient size
 
of intermediaries. The economies of scale and scope identified in propositions
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3, 6 and 8 imply unambiguously that trading companies will be large, and will
 
handle 
orders from multiple buyers. By contrast, propositions 1, 2, 4 and 7
 
point to variations across countries in the efficient size of 
 trading
 
companies. Propositions 1, 2 and 7 imply that trading companies will be larger
 
in countries where set-up 
costs of procurement are relatively high; and
 
proposition 
4 implies that trading companies will be smaller 
in countries
 
intensive in market transactions lubricated by goodwill and associated informal
 
linkages. On both counts 
trading companies would be expected to 
be larger in
 
Korea than in Taiwar., given lower levels of per capita income and education and
 
less experience with uarket transactions in 'he former nation at 
the outset of
 
the two countries' export-led industrial expansion.19
 
In all, propositions 1-8 identify 
the circumstances in which 
procurement
 
through intermediaries represents the 
efficient institutional mechanism 
of
 
procurement, and 
clarify the circumstances 
in which (as in Taiwan) ma-kets.
 
involving intermediaries 
will be populated by relatively small firms. What
 
remains is to wodel formally the 
relations among reciprocal market-completing
 
externalities, endogenous expansion, and the 
size of firms in the context of
 
markets in which intermediaries channel orders from buyers to manufacturers.
 
INTERACTIONS AMONG BUYERS, TRADERS AND MANUFACTURERS
 
This 
section develops a model that illustrates how reciprocal 
market­
completing externalities 
among buyers, traders and manufacturers can help
 
19 Thus Taiwan's per capita 
GNP in 1955 was more than 70 percent above
 
that of Korea; and in 1960 the percentage of Taiwanese above the age of six

with twelve or more years of schooling was almost three 
times that of Korea.
 
Back in the 
late 19th century, at a time when Korea's economy was not yet fully

monetized, Taiwan was 
rapidly being settled by migrants from Fukien province,

located between th. major trading ports 
of Shanghai and Hong Kong. See Levy
(1988) for additional institutional details and for analysis of their impact on
 
the size of firms.
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sustain endogenous expansion subsequent to an initial exogenous stimult.s. The 
next section examines some comparative static determinants of the magnitude of 
any endogenous effect. Consistent with the central role given to search costs 
in the analysis of the efficiency advantages of traders, the model begins by 
depicting the 
search behavior of individual buyers, traders and manufacturers.
 
Individual Search Behavior
 
Given that buyers procure through intermediaries, the model involves three
 
classes of economic agents, and four distinct problems of search: buyers 
must
 
decide how intensively to 
sample for a reliable and favorable price-quality
 
match among variouF intermediaries; traders must decide 
how intensively to
 
search for profitable orders to
among potential buyers, and how intensively 

search for capab]e and reliable manufacturers; and manufacturers must decide
 
how intensively to canvass alternative traders in search of profitable orders.
 
The comparative static analysis 
 in the next section explores the
 
implications of alternative specifications of the efficient size of traders
 
and of manufacturers. Assume 
for now that orders by buyers are heterogenous in
 
character, and each for identical small volumes, and 
that each trader and
 
manufacturer h6Ddles only 
a single order per period of time. Given an exogenous
 
specification of the volume produced or 
traded by each agent, the only choice
 
variable is the optimal level of search 
by individual buyers, traders and
 
manufacturers. Equations (1) and (2) summarize 2
in the simplest possible way '
 
20 The assumption that prices can be stated directly as 
functions of
 
search intensity characterizes only the most simple search models such as
 
Stigler (1961). 
As Rothschild (1973) summarizes, more sophisticated effort
 
would take as its starting point 
an optimal search rule based or. sequential
 
search and some reservation price. The 
rationale for the simplification here
 
is, first, that the focus here is on the de-erminants of, and some comparative

statics associated with, changes in search costs rather than the clarification
 
of a rule for optimal search; and, second, that the comparative static results
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an individual buyer's optimization problem for each order that she places.
 
MAX 1 Bi 	 - Q[PB - PT(nB)] Csi(AT, nB) (1)
 
- RB(nB; Q, PB) Ci(AT, nB) 
 (2)
 
where
 
Q - volume per trader
 
-PB mean value of an exogenously specified distribution of
 
prices at which buyers resell
 
PT - prite at which buyer purchases from trader 
nB number of traders sampled by buyer-

CGi- costs of search for the i'th buyer.
 
AT - number of traders
 
Buyers are assumed to re-sell at a price equal to the mean value of the
 
distribution of purchase prices offered by consuners.21 Purchase price is taken
 
to be a 	decreasing function of search intensity; search costs are taken to
 
increase 	with the intensity of search, and (for reasons to be explored below)
 
to decrease as the number of traders rises.2 2 As the i subscripts signify,
 
individual buyers 
are assumed to vary in the efficiency of their search
 
on the impact on search intensity of changes in search cost obtained from more
 
general Eearch rules tend to correspond to the results of the simplified rule
 
adopted here (Rothschild 1974).
 
21 The model could straightforwardly be extended to include search
 
behavior in buyers' resale markets. But such an extension would add to
 
complexity of the model while affording no additional insights.
 
22 One other variable which 
might have been included as a determinant of
 
search costs, but which I exclude far reasons of simplicity, is the intensity
 
of search by traders (and also the corresponding intensities in equationz (3)

and (4) below): the more actively are traders searching for buyers, the lower
 
might be 
the costs of buyer search. Mortensen (1982) explores in a multi-period
 
model how the privately optimal intensity of search by a potential partner on
 
one side of a match varies with changes in intensities of search by potential
 
complementary partners.
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efforts.
 
Traders' search is in all but one respect identical to that of buyers:
 
traders search in two independent arenas; among buyers for the 
highest
 
available selling price for 
given product quality, and among manufacturers for
 
the lowest available purchase price 
for given quality. Thus the objective of
 
each trader is to
 
MAX HTi - Q[PT(nTB) - PM(nTM)] 
- C1 (nTB, AB) - Cg(nTM, AM) (3)
 
" RT(nTB, nTM, Q) - CT(nTB, AB, XB) - Ctl(nTM, AM, XB) (4) 
where
 
PM - purchase price of trader.
 
As for manufacturers, even though the quantity produced by each manufacturer
 
is set exogenously, the optimizing 
equation includes a term reflecting
 
manufacturing production costs; the term 
signals differences in efficiency
 
among manufacturing firms. Thus
 
MAX HMi - PM(n4) - C-iQ) - Ci(nM, AT) (5)
 
where
 
Ci - total costs of production.
 
Three features of these individual optimization problems are relevant for
 
the present analysis. First, and for present purposes least interesting, first
 
order conditions and corresponding optimal levels of 
search can readily be
 
calculated from equations (2), (4) and (5):
 
=RB' (6)
 
anB 
 anB
 
RT Dn- (7)
 
dnTB ~nTB
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-- -T-

2 (8)anTM nTM 
3 MDCM' (9)3 nM a nM 
Equations (6) ­ (9) imply that for each order individual economic agents will
 
continue to search as long the marginal
as 
 benefits exceed the marginal costs
 
of that search.
 
A second relevant feature of the individual optimization problems is the
 
inclusion of an Ak term in the 
search cost expressions of each actor 
of type
 
Aj ; 
 these terms incorporate reciprocal market-completing externalities
 
formally into the model. There are three reasons why the costs of search for a 
reliable partner by parties on one side of a market might be lower the greater 
is the number of parties on the other side of marketthat same and thus, other 
things equal, why traders 
are more likely to procure from a particular country
 
the greater is the number of manufacturers producing the sought-for products, 
and prospective manufacturers are more likely to initiate production the 
greater is 
the number of traders seeking to procure the relevant product.
 
First, a market participant is 
less vulnerable to noncompetitive tactics the
 
larger is the number of potential transacting parties. Second, competition
 
among large numbers 
 can spur reductions in transactions costs via the
 
refinement- of product and trading 
norms, and increases in the willingness of
 
industry participants 
to abide by these norms. Third, an increase in the number
 
of participants 
on one side of the market can create 
positive agglomeration
 
externalities, and associated 
 reductions in costs search,
the of 
 for
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participants 
 on the other side. 2 3 
 The source of these agglomeration
 
externalities is the increased social and physical proximity among buyers and 
sellers that results from ongoing entry. Assume a random distribution among 
manufacturers 
in tile attributes of reliability 
and of social (or physical) 
proximity to some intermediary, with the two attributes entirely uncorrelated 
with one 
another. Assume further that these distributions remain unchanged with
 
the 
 entry of additional manufacturers. 
Since 
 the ratio of reliable to
 
unreliable manufacturers does not change, the costs of search to an 
intermediary who probed randomly across the sample would be unaffected by the 
addition of new entrants. However, consistent with the efficiency advantages of
 
trading among familiar associates highlighted in propositions 4 and 5 earlier, 
search costs would be 
lower the more readily can participants on one side of a
 
market 
tap at low cost into channels that 
afford reliable information on the
 
attributes of 
 some prospective trading partner 
 on the other. Thus,
 
intermediaries would not 
probe randomly across the sample: search costs would
 
be minimized if intermediaries targeted their efforts at nearby manufacturers. 
So continuing entry permits 
traders to concentrate 
their search efforts on
 
progressively more nearby manufacturers, thereby reducing the 
costs of search.
 
A third feature of equations (2), (4) and (5) is 
that they point to a second
 
set of equilibrium conditions along with 
first order conditions (6) - (9). 
Given the assumptions of no obstacles to entry, and of variation in efficiency
 
among firms, the number of firms of each type is determined implicitly by the 
following three conditions for the marginal firms in each class -- the ABzth 
23 The discussion that follows is a straightforward application 
of the
 
economies of agglomeration argument used 
to account for the growth of cities.
See, for example, 
Rabenau (1979), summarized in Miyao 
(1987) pp. 884-886;
Richardson (1979) pp. 419-424; also Sveikauskus (1975).
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buyer, the ATzth trader, and the Amzth manufacturer.
 
11Bz - DB(Q[PB - PT(nB)] - Cz(AT , rB)) - 0 (10) 
Tz - DT(Q(PT(nTB) - PM(nTM)I - Csz(nTB, AB, XB) - Csz(nTM, AM, XB) -0 (11) 
NMz - DM(PM(nM) - Cz(Q) - Csz(nM, AT) - 0 (12) 
where 
Dk - number of orders per firm of type k (assumed, except where
 
stated explicitly, to equal one).
 
Equations (10), (11) and (12) implicitly define response functions which 
depict the number of buyers, traders and manufacturers respectively desirous of
 
participating in trade:
 
AB - AB[AT, PT; PB, DB, Q] aAB/PAT, 3 AB/ PB > 0; 2 AB/PT < 0 (13) 
AT - AT[AM, AB, PT, PM; XB, XM, DT, QI aAT/ AM, aAT/AAB, aAT/d PT > 0 
aAT/d PM < 0 (14) 
AM - AM[AT, PM] Ajj/1AT, DAM/ PM > 0 (15) 
The partial effects sunmaarized in equations 
(13) - (15) follow directly from 
the discussion ths far. An added restriction is that 2 Aj/,aA < 0, that the 
magnitude of incremental transactions cost reductions by participants of 
type
 
Aj as a result of entry by participants of type Ak declines with increases in
 
the number of participants of type Ak. Discussion of the partial 
effects of
 
changes in Dj and Q is postponed to the next section.
 
With the addition of equilibrium conditions for the buyer-trader and trader­
manufacturer markets the model is complete. Thus,
 
ABDB - ATDT (16)
 
ATDT - AMOM 
 (17).
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Endogenous Expansion
 
Equations (13) 
 - (17) and the associated restrictions define a system of
 
five equations in five 
unknowns. Two stationary points 
are consistent with
 
these equations: zero-participation, with no 
markets, and no prices; and, for
 
any given set of values of the 
exogenous variables, a unique 
set of positive
 
equilibrium values 
(AB, AT, AM, PT 
, PM). Underlying the transition from zero­
participation to the positive-value equilibrium 
is a of
process endogenous
 
expansion subsequent 
to an initial exogenous stimulus, 
a process driven by
 
cumulative declines in the costs 
of market transactions 
via the impact of
 
reciprocal market-completing externalities.
 
Figure I illustrates 
 the implied interactions 
 among traders and
 
manufacturers, assuming for the momen- that the number of potential buyers from
 
the exporting country, and 
the price (or, more precisely, distribution of
 
prices) at which 
traders sell 
 to buyers, remains 
fixed. Consistent with
 
equation (14), 
 RT depicts the 
 trader response f,n-tion: the number 
of
 
intermediaries desirous 
of trading, given 
the number of manufacturers 
in the
 
exporting nation. 
 RM depicts the corresponding response 
 function for
 
manufacturers. 
Thus, the intersection 
of RM and RT represents the point at
 
which (for a given distribution of price centering around mean, PM) preferences
 
among potential traders and manufacturers as 
to 
the number of participants are
 
consistent with one another.
 
Full equilibrium 
in the trader-manufacturer market 
requires, not only that
 
desired demand 
equals desired supply, but that 
actual demand equals 
actual
 
supply. So, given the 
assumption that 
traders and manufacturers 
each handle a
 
single order 
of quantity Q, full equilibrium must necessarily lie 
on the 45
 
degree line, 
EP. Any price distribution with mean above 
some equilibrium price,
 
FIGURE 1 
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PM, shifts both RM and RT 
to the right, inducing excess actual supply (even at
 
the intersection of the shifted RM 
and RT schedules, where desired den..nd
 
equ is desired supply at 
the new, highei , price); and ai'y price distribution 
with mean below PM shifts RM and RI to the left, inducing excess demand. Thus, 
for a given set of values of the exogenous variables PB and AB there exists 
a
 
unique distribution of prices 
with mean P* at which equilibrium point C 
is
 
sustained. For expositional convenience, both RM RT
and are drawn on the
 
assumption that PM 
(and PT) equal this equilibriun level. What is 
the process
 
whereby this equilibrium is obtained?
 
Assu.e an exogenous increase in the 
nLmber of manufacturers 
ill the first
 
period of the analysis, to AMI 
in Figure I, disrupting an initial 
zero­
participation equilibriun. 
(ln the Taiwanese footwear industry, this exogenous
 
increase was 
the result of a decision on 
the part of Japanese trading companies
 
to relocate production for export 
to the United States 
from Japan to Taiwan.)
 
Entry by manufacturers generates positive market-completing external economies,
 
reducing the 
costs of trader search and 
thereby inducing ATI traders to 
enter
 
in the subsequent period,24 
(point B in Figure 1). 
Entry of traders creates, in
 
turn, positive external economies 
and lower search costs for manufacturers,
 
spurring additional entry in 
the next period of AM2-AMI of these firms (moving
 
to point C in the figure). The process of 
ongoing, sequential declines in
 
transactions costs, and corresponding increases in the number of market
 
24 An assumption here 
is that the initial manufacturing entrants do not
 
reserve 
their capacity exclusively for the buyer that induced them to enter in
the first place. Again, this assumption is consistent with the experience

Taiwan, where manufacturers continually are 
in
 
on the look-our to diversify risk
by broadening their base of customers.
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participants continues, 5
spurred by ongoing reciprocal imbalances2 between
 
actual and desired 
numbers of traders and manufacturers, and associated
 
imbalances 
 between the quantities supplied and demanded, until equilibrium is
 
reached at point D in Figure 1, with AM3 manufacturers and AT3 traders.
 
The number of buyers does not, of course, remain constant with variations in
 
the number of traders. Rather, paralleling the interactton illustrated 
in
 
Figure 1, a rise in the 
number of traders reduces the coscs of search and 
thereby (assuming -- consistent with the requirement that the exporting country 
supplies only a small fraction of total demand -- that consumer prices remain 
constant) increases the profitability of all buyers, thus 
inducing additional
 
buyer entry; and an increase in the number of buyers induces additional entry 
by traders. Thus, as Figure 2 illustrates, the trader response function in
 
trader-manufacturer space shifts outward with each increase in the number of 
buyers; the 
shifts in Rr in turn put upward pressure on PM. The process of 
progressive increases in AB, shifts in RT, increases in PM and associated
 
shifts in RT and RM, reaches full equilibr.um in the number of buyers, traders
 
and manufacturers 
at a point such as X in Figure 2, associated with a higher
 
price (and thus a rightward shift in R 1 
to RM2) than was point D in Figure 1.
 
One final feature of the model: endogenous expansion is a two-way process, 
25 At point B in Figure 1, for example, there will. be an excess demand on
 
the part of traders for production by manufacturers; and at point C an excess
 
supply of productive capacity. These successive disequibria will be associated
 
with ongoing fluctuations in price around the equilibrium price that clears the
 
market at point D. Analysis of adjustment with prices endogenous reveals the 
process to be rather more complex than is implied by Figure 1: the magnitude
of each increase in Ak in response to prior increases in Aj is damped by
offsetting price changes which shift RM and RT. But, under all plausible

assumptions as to the magnitude of the shifts in the response schedules to 
price changes, demand and supply curves (drawn as 
 functions of PM) shift
 
continually to 
the right with each successive iteration, until the eventual
 
equilibrium is attained.
 
FIGURE 2 
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dependent upon the 
reciprical character of the agglomeration externalities.
 
Figures 3a and b illustrate. Unlike Figures 1 and 2, Figure 3a takes the price
 
sustaining RMI and RTI to be, not the eventual equilibrium price PA, but some 
arbitrary PMI at which demand is in excess of supply. As before, the exogenous 
entry of AMI manufacturers induces ATI traders to enter; but now, as can be 
seen in Figure 3b,the resultant excess demand puts upward pressure on prices. 
Given reciprocal externalities any upward pressure on prices would be offset by
 
induced entry of manufacturers in response to 
the entry of ATI traders, and the
 
associated shift in the manufacturer supply schedule from AMI to AM2 in Figure 
3b.26 However, with no reciprocity the manufacturer supply curve does not 
shift, and price necessarily rises above PMI, shifting 
the trader response
 
function in Figure 3a inward to 
RT2. The higher price induces entry on the part
 
of manufacturers (to AM2 in Figures 3 and b),a but the magnitude of this 
induced entry -- and thus the associated rightward shift of AT in Figure 3b and 
increase to AT3 in the desired number of traders in Figures 3 a and b -- is 
smaller than it would have been with reciprocity. As drawn in Figure 3 the
 
eventual equilibrium price will be above PM2, and the equilibrium number of 
manufacturers (an( thus traders) above AM2. More generally, the degree to which
 
the number of manufacturers exceeds AM1 in equilibrium 
will be smaller the
 
more price inelastic is manufacturer supply, the more price elastic is trader 
demand, and the less responsive is trader entry to the number of
 
manufacturers. Whatever the assumptions, 
 Figure 3 reveals that, absent
 
reciprocity, price increases choke off the endogenous response 
to an exogenous
 
stimulus at a level 
 well below D in Figure 1 (or X in Figure 2).
 
26 Shifting AM such that PMI becomes an 
'equilibriun' price (as long as AM
 
- AMI and AT - ATI) is an arbitrary simplification that aids exposition but 
is
 
not required to make the central point in the 
text.
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Manufacturers may enjoy agglomeration economies only if buyers handle their
 
procurement through offices located within the exporting country. And
 
intermediaries may be more likely to establish such offices than are direct
 
buyers. Given these last propositions, the degree of reciprocity, and thus the
 
magnitude of evaoge:.ious expansion, will be greater with procurement through
 
intermediaries than with direct procurement.
 
INITIAL ENDOWMENTS, THE SIZE OF FIPMS, AND ENDOGENOUS EXPANSION
 
A central proposition of this paper is that endogenous expansion sustained
 
by market-completing externalities will be greater in economies in which small
 
and medium enterprises play a central role than in economies dominated by large
 
firms. The comparative static results presented in this section support this
 
central proposition, and offer some added insights into the circumstances under
 
which a nation might fruitfully pursue growth via small ard medium enterprises.
 
Endogenous expansion and the Size of Firms
 
There are two potential sources of variation in the sizes of traders and of
 
manufacturers: variations in the number of orders handled by each firm; and
 
variations in the volume of individual orders. The impact of variation in the
 
number of orders per firm emerges most straightforwardly if Ak is reinterpreted 
to signify the number of orders rather than the number of firms, even though 
the number of traders ox manufacturers -- and not their size -- still is 
presumed to generate external economies. As long as each firm handles only one 
order, altering the definitions of the axes makes no difference to the 
interpretation of Figure 4. Thus AMl-ATl in Figure 4 characterizes the 
equilibrium number of both firms and orders given only one order per firm. Now 
double the number of orders per trader. With AT1 orders, the number of traders
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is cut in half, to what would have been AT2 in Figure 4 had the axes measured
 
numbers of firms. The manufacturer response function RMI in Figure 4 implies
 
that only AM2 manufacturers would be induced to enter, given AT2 traders. Thus,
 
with Ak signifying the number of orders, doubling the number of orders per firm
 
shifts the wanufacturer response function left, from RMI to RM2 .2 7 Subsequent
 
to the resultant price increases -- and corresponding shifts in RT and RM-­
equilibrium is re-established at point 5, with a smaller volume of trade than
 
prevailed at point 4.
 
Formally, let DT equal the number of orders per trader, and DM equal the 
corresponding number for manufacturers, and (with AM and AT now signifying the 
desired number of orders placed by all manufacturers and traders respectively), 
and adjust the independent variables AT and AM in the manufacturer and trader 
response functions (equatinns (14) and (15) ) to cead AT/DT and AM/DM. 
Consistent with earlier propositions, and the proposition that the number of 
firms -- and not their size -- determines the magnitude of market completing 
externalities, DAT/3(AM/DM) and AM/3(AT/DT) are taken to be positive. Totally 
differentiating equations (14), (15) and (17), reorganizing, and using Cramer's 
rule to calculate the impact of variations in, say, DT on the equilibrium
 
numbter of orders yields:
 
dAM = _(ATiP AT(I/D_ ) M ) { Mi (AT/Dr)) (18) 
dDT O-T/a-PM{(1/DT) (AM/d[AT/DT]) - 1) + aAM/dPM(I - (I/DM)(a AT/ AM/DMi)) 
27 Note that: the volume decline implied in the text would be offset to the 
degree that the value of reciprocal externalities created per trader rose with 
the number of orders per trader. Insofar as the source of reciprocal 
externalities lies, however, in the density with which traders are distributed 
among the population, there is no reason to expect such changes in the value of 
reciprocal externalities, especially for putative entrants -- manufacturers 
that tjve not yet extablished a trading relationship with any intermediary. 
-- 
-- 
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which will be less 
 than zero as long as (l/DT)(aAM/,a[AT/DT]) and
 
(I/DM)(0&T/D[AM/DM]) are less than one. 
The two terms are nothing other than
 
the slopes of the response functions with DT and DM greater than one, 
and the
 
axes 
measuring total number of orders. The earlier assumptions as to the first
 
yields exactly parallel
 
and second order partial derivatives of equations (14) and (15) guarantee 
stability and thus that as is evident in Figures 1-3 at equilibrium 
3AM/ AT and AT/PAM < 1; so the required conditions will necessarily be 
satisfied. The comparative statics of dAM/dDM an 
result. 
Note that, as would readily be apparent from a straightforward
 
extension of the graphical 
analysis in Figure 4, parallel increases in DT and
 
DM do not serve as reciprocal offsets, but rather reinforce each other in their
 
trade-reducing effects. 
In all, Figure 4 and equation (18) together imply that
 
the absolute magnitude of external 
economies of agglomeration, and thus the
 
potential for cumulative endogenous expansion, 
fal. - with increases in the 
number of orders hardled by individual firms. 
Increases in firm size via increases in the volume of individual orders also
 
reduce the potential for endogenous expansion; but the mechanism through which
 
this reduction is effected differs from that 
associated with increases in the
 
number of orders 
per firm. Contrary to the analysis of the impact of
 
variations in 
the nuxber of orders 
per firm, return to the earlier assumption
 
that Ak measures the number of firms 
of each type, with each firm producing
 
only one order per period of time. But assume 
now that the ratio of profits to
 
revenues, not the absolute 
level of profits, determines the magnitude of entry
 
in response to changes in the profits of the 
incremental firm; a focus 
on the
 
ratio appears plausible insofar as large firms 
are likely to be less sensitive
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to small absolute changes in profitability than are small.2 8 When order size is
 
held constant, the distinction between absolute profits and the ratio of
 
profits to revenues per order is irrelevant. However, once order size is
 
permitted to vary, a given change in absolute profits per order could be
 
associated with a range of changes in total profits as a proportion ot
 
revenues. It follows straightforwardly that aAkiQ < 0, that small absolute 
profit changes per order of the kind induced by reciprocal market-completing
 
externalities would have less impact on entry the larger is the magnitude of
 
each individual order. 2 9 Or, to put the point differently, the role of search
 
costs in shaping entry decisions, and thus the potential for endogezious
 
expansion, is likely to fall as order size increases.
 
Initial Endowments and Eiidogenous Expansion
 
In a separate paper I have explored how, as a result of deep-rooted
 
historical differences,3 0  the cost of market transactions was likely to have
 
been higher at the outset of outward-oriented industrialization in Korea than
 
in Taiwan. The objective here is to explore theoretically, assuming no cross­
country variations in the size of firms, the impact of cross-country
 
differences in the cost of market transactions costs on the magnitude of the
 
endogenous expansion subsequent to an initial exogenous stimulus.
 
28 Some term of the form dAk/dlkz is implicit in the transition from the
 
individual profit functions (10)-(12) to the response function (13)-(15). A
 
focus on the ratio of profits to revenue implies that the relevant term is
 
dAk/d("'kz/PkQ).
 
29 Note that a mechanism of the kind just described accounts only for the
 
impact of an increase in the size of individual orders, and not the impact of
 
an increase in the number of orders per iianufacturer insofar as search costs
 
are an iLncreasing function of the number of orders.
 
30 Footnote 19 summarizes some of the differences explored in Levy (1988).
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Augmentiiug equation (14) 
with an additional variable, XM, a country-specific
 
proxy for the efficiency with which traders 3 1 
engage in market transactions in
 
some exporting 
 country, aids in analyzing the impact of cross-country
 
differences irn transactions 
costs. A high value of XM signals that, independent
 
of the identity of traders procuring from a given supplying nat! a, that nation
 
is relatively efficient in its execution of market transactions.
 
There are 
two different channels through which variations in XM might affect
 
the magnitude of endogenous expansion subsequent to initial
an exogenous
 
stimulus. First, a larger endogenous stimulus will be needed 
to set in motion 
an endogenous response the higher are the costs of market transactions. As 
Figure 5 illustrates, an unusually low value of XM might shift the trader
 
response function so far to the right (to, say RT4) that exogenous entry of AMI
 
manufacturers is insufficient 
 to induce any endogenous entry by traders. 
Second, highe values of XM -- signifying a greater facility in, say, bilingual 
communication 
-- might increase the value of market completing externalities
 
created 
for traders by the entry of manufacturers, and thereby increase the
 
number of traders desirous of entry 
for any given number of manufacturers.
 
Formally, 32 CT/3AM3XM > 0. In this second channel, 
an increase in XM shifts the
 
trader response function from RTI 
to RT2 in Figure 5. RT2 now intersects RMl at
 
position 2. At that position however, desired demand by traders is 
in excess of
 
manufacturer 
supply. Prices rise, Inducing shifts right (to RM2 and RT3) in
 
both trader and manufacturer response functions. 
Equilibrium is restored at
 
position 3, with values of AM and AT above those that prevailed at position 1.
 
This last result can readily be 
derived formally. Total differentiation of
 
31 In principle the augmenting variable incould as readily be included 
equation (15), the manufacturer response function. 
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equations (14), (15) and (17) and 
solution of the resulting three equation
 
simultaneous system yields
 
dAT ( 3Am/ PM)(:;AT/,:Xh - DAT/PPM)
dXb ( 3AT/dPM)(aAM/ AT - 1) -+ (AM/aPM)(l 
- 'AT/AM) 
which iI;il i, Lhan zero long the,-ct r as as values at equilibrium of M/ T 
and -AT/AM are less than one. Since equilibrium in Figures 1-3 can be achieved 
only along the 45 degree line (where AT - AM) the required conditions will 
necessarily be met as long as the system converges stably to equilibrium.
 
Variations in the transactional efficiency of manufacturers 
can be shown to
 
have the exactly parallel effect. To state 
these results in a less technical
 
way, the more efticient are firms from 
 a country in managing market
 
Eransactions, the larger will 
be the magnitude of the endogenous expansion
 
induced by some initial exogenous stimulus. It follows that countries with
 
transactionally inefficient markets, such as 
Korea at the outset of its export­
oriented industrialization, will enjoy relatively little 
endogenous expansion
 
via market completing externalities and might do well 
to consider alternatives
 
to industrialization based on small and medium enterprises.
 
SOME IMPLICATIONS
 
The paper concludes by laying out some implications of the analysis
 
concerning the relationship between industrial appropriate
structure and 

policies to promote industrialization. Four points are highlighted.
 
First, reciprocal market-completing externalities 
 and the as;3ociated
 
endogenous expansion emerge in the analysis as 
the small enterprise counterpart
 
of economies 
 of learning by large firms. As numerous students of Korean
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industrialization have emphasized,3 2 the ability 
of large firms to reap
 
economies of learning 
from large volume production has been central to that
 
nation's continuing industrial success. Ongoing in-house technical learning is,
 
to be sure, important also for smallei- manufacturers in Taiwan and elsewhere. 3 3
 
However, insofar as industrialization based on 
small and medium enterprises
 
involves an ongoing expansion 
in the number of firms, market-completing
 
external economies would appear to be important in promoting entry and thereby
 
Bustaining expansion.
 
Second, the model has highlighted the central role of traders in sustaining
 
industrial expansion in which small and medium enterprises produce for export.
 
Absent traders and, from a static 
-erspective, a nation will lack access 
to the
 
small volume orders on which smaller manufacturers depend. From a dynamic
 
perspective, if procurement is direct and externalities as a result are enjoyed
 
largely on one side of 
the market, price changes will rapidly choke off any
 
endogenous response to 
an initial exogenous stimulus. Endogenous expansion via
 
reciprocal market-completing externalities is 
necessarily a two-way process, 
a
 
process that in 
final export markets will be set 
in motion only weakly, if at
 
all, in the absence of traders. To put the point somewhat differently, a
 
proliferation of small traders can reverse the process whereby "the presence of
 
people who wish to pawn bad wares as good 
wares tends to drive out the
 
legitimate business". 34 
Rather, the promotion of small traders 
can help set in
 
motion a virtuous spiral, a sequential, cumulative reinforcing 
process of
 
32 See for example Pack and Westphal (1986), Amsden (1988).
 
33 For an analysis of the role of technical learning in one Taiwanese
 
industry, see Amsden (1985).
 
34 Akerlof (1970) p. 495.
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expanded participation in 
a nation's manufactures export activity on 
the part
 
of traders, manufacturers and foreign buyers.
 
Third, the comparative static results 
suggest t.hat the promotion (as in
 
Korea) 
of large trading companies that specialize 
in the export of products
 
manufactured by small and medium enterprises is 
likely to be 
a poor substitute
 
for the promotion of multiple, 
independent smaller 
trading companies. Large
 
trading companies that 
are specifically mandated to 
serve small manufacturers
 
can, to be sure, provide access 
to small volume orders. However, this access
 
would 
generate fewer reciprocal market-completing 
externalities, and 
weaker
 
endogenous expansion, 
 insofar as 
 a single large organization is 
 more
 
centralized organizationally and more 
concentrated geographically than would be
 
a large number of smaller intermediaries handling 
a similar overall volume of
 
3 5
 
trade.
 
Fourth, the comparative static results imply 
that the promotion of large
 
firms might usefully be viewed as 
an efficient institutional substitute in
 
societies where 
 costs of market Lansactions
the arc high. The analysis has
 
shown 
that, where markets are transactionally relatively efficient, an 
initial
 
exogenous stimulus 
can set in motion a spontaneous process 
of cumulative,
 
sequential unbalanced process of industrial growth through the proliferation of
 
small manufacturers 
and traders; 
 the data summarized 
in the introduction
 
suggest that something of this 
kind occured 
in Taiwan. By contrast, where the
 
costs of market transactions are high, 
an exogenous stimulus will yield little
 
endogenous response; 
so societies where markets in 
general operate poorly, 
or
 
where the 
cost of external transactions in particular is 
unusually high, might
 
35 But Yoshino and Lifson (1985) pp. 
49-51 argue that Japan's large
trading companies provided extensive 
opportunities 
for direct and indirect
 
export by small Japanese manufactures.
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do well to pursue industrialization via the promotion of large firms. 3 6 This
 
hypothesis of large firms as institutional substitutes for poorly functioning
 
markets is consistent with the Korean experience in the light of both that
 
country's large firm bias, and of historical evidence that markets were less
 
well developed at the outset of export-led industrialization in Korea than they
 
were in Taiwan.3 7
 
36 Given, that is, confidence in the ability of a nation's government to
 
withstand the unusually abundant opportunities for socially inefficient rent­
seeking associated with policies to promote large firms.
 
37 For further details, see Levy (1988).
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